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J. Skelly Wright
By THOMAS C. GREY*
My Yale professors warned me about Judge Wright before I went
to work for him in 1968. I remember best the late Alexander Bickel's
portrayal. In one case, the Judge had held a hearing at a patient's bed-
side on a hospital's request that he order a blood transfusion.' To Pro-
fessor Bickel, this symbolized Warren-era judicial activism-a judge
"bursting" from his courtroom, "rushing" to the hospital "with robes
flapping." On another occasion, I recall Professor Bickel analogizing
Judge Wright's judicial intervention into the District of Columbia
schools to a coup by a Latin American junta.2
These bits of Bickelian hyperbole were only colorful expressions of
views put less memorably by others among my teachers.3 So was born
in my mind the apparition of Judge Wright as revolutionary, as an in-
congruously robed Man on Horseback, striking with the sword of jus-
tice at those whom his messianic intuition identified as oppressors.
With some fantasy like this in the back of my mind, I half anticipated
my clerkship, not as a respectable job for a young law graduate, but as
a romantic mission, an assignment as subaltern to a great and feared
rebel.
In fact, Judge Wright did become a hero to me, but a hero very
different from the fantasy. Before describing the Judge as he is, I must
linger for a moment more on the Wright of my imagination. That ap-
parition was not a private invention of mine, for I remember contem-
poraries asking me, with a voyeuristic excitement at the illicit, just what
it was like to clerk for so wild and unrestrained a judge. (My protests
against the characterization were discounted as the results of clerkly
© Copyright 1980, Thomas C. Grey.
* Professor of Law, Stanford University; law clerk to Judge Wright, 1968-69.
1. Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
2. The case in question was Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.C. Cir. 1967), aj'd
sub. nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
3. Judge Wright himself regarded Professor Bickel as the most formidable critic of the
approach to constitutional adjudication with which he identified. See Wright, Professor
Rickel, the Scholary Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARv. L. REv. 769 (1971).
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loyalty.) What led our elders to create this Wright-apparition in their
own minds and then in ours?
A full answer would illuminate much about the history of Ameri-
can law in the middle years of this century. Judge Wright himself has
noted the different formative experiences of my teachers' genertion and
my own: for them, the New Deal and the Court-packing plan, Hitler
and Stalin, World War II and the Cold War; for us, the Brown case, the
sit-ins, the Vietnam War.4 One might also consider the likely effects of
legal realism on my teachers' generation. A few of the most able and
vivid of the previous generation's teachers had embraced a deep scepti-
cism that proclaimed the death of the old gods of the Law-not only
the old-fashioned dream of a rational common law inhabiting a heaven
of concepts, but even the progressive and policy-infused conception of
law held by a Pound or a Cardozo.5
Such a radical scepticism, pressed with energy and ability as it
was, must be profoundly disturbing to young future law professors. If
the Law is really dead, the judges remain, with disputes to settle, with
considerable powers at this disposal, but without a creed to guide or
confine them. And the law professors also remain, still with institutions
to study and skills to teach, but without a doctrine to expound-oracles
of the law no longer. I suspect that behind the jurisprudence of neutral
principle and legal process out of which the Wright-apparition arose,
lay the repressed but never exorcised terror of radical legal scepticism,
a terror threatening not only caste, prestige and status, but also the
ideal of the rule of law itself.6
The Judge Wright I came to know during my year as his law clerk
did not fit the image associated with this terror. Of course, on his rec-
ord he is a judge more than usually courageous and independent of
immediate public opinion, and one with a stronger than usual sense of
substance over form.7 Apart from these qualities, themselves tradition-
ally admired judicial virtues, he bears little resemblance to the image of
4. See id. at 804.
5. Radical legal scepticism is most often identified with Jerome Frank; see, eg., J.
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). The jurisprudential work of Thurman Ar-
nold falls within the same tradition; see, e.g., T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT
(1935). To me, the best statement of the radical realist position remains Gilmore, For Wesley
Sturges: On the Teaching and Study of Law, 72 YALE L.J. 646, 651-53 (1963).
6. The sense of outrage provoked by extreme realism is well expressed by Professor
Bickel in A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 78-84 (1962).
7. These qualities of Judge Wright were all perhaps best displayed in his handling of




the existential hero or Nietzschean superman in a robe.8
Let me recollect him as I came to know him a decade ago.9 To
take a small matter first, the Judge is steady, orderly and efficient in his
work habits. He works hard during regular hours, and there is none of
the coffee-and-shirt-sleeves red-eyed melodrama that is standard in
Washington and in many judicial chambers. He runs a smoothly func-
tioning office: the splendid Martha Scallon efficiently manages the sec-
retarial work; the clerks clerk; the judge judges; and the work gets
done, often ahead of time, without much fuss.
The Judge is a professional at his main job--deciding. It is a reve-
lation to watch him move, without apparent effort, from informing
himself about some matter to making up his mind what to do about it.
He does not indulge himself in the standard Washington nonsense
about the "lonely agony of decision." Perhaps for that reason, he is
unusually willing to reconsider a question if new arguments are forth-
coming. I recall approaching him cautiously early in my clerkship to
urge that he dissent in a case in which he had already voted with the
rest of the panel. An opinion had been circulated, and the case was
ready to come down. I was surprised that he heard me out so patiently,
and then amazed when, after pressing me on a few points, he put me to
work on a draft dissent. In other cases, I argued with him at length and
unsuccessfully; he was never offended by what others might have taken
as an impertinent challenge from a young clerk, just out of school, with
little experience of life and a high opinion of himself.
The Judge's willingness both to listen and to talk helps make him
the easiest of men to work for. His openness is simply one aspect of a
nature almost wholly lacking in self-importance. I saw in him none of
the posturing, none of the publicity seeking, none of the need to insist
on his status and wisdom that seem the occupational diseases of judges.
8. Nietzsche himself put a somewhat overripe statement of the terror facing the radical
realist judge in the mouth of his Zarathustra: "Can you furnish yourself with your own
good and evil and hang up your own will above yourself as a law? Can you be judge of
yourself and avenger of your law?
"It is terrible to be alone with the judge and avenger of one's own law. It is to be like a
star thrown forth into empty space and into the icy breath of solitude." F. NIErzscHE, THus
SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA 89 (trans. W. Kaufmann, 1961).
Compare Grant Gilmore's restatement of the jurisprudence of Wesley Sturges: "The-
ory is'a dead end, doctrine is absurd, rules of law are merely meaningless sequences of
words .... [He] came early to a conception of the law which was cold, bleak and barren-
like a winter landscape. There was no comfort, no solace, no softness in what he saw."
Gilmore, supra note 5, at 653-54.
9. I speak of the Judge in the present tense though, of course, most of my knowledge of
him came during the year of my clerkship; from what I have seen of the Judge since then, he
has not changed in any essential respect.
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He deals with his clerks as junior collaborators rather than as servants,
and treats everyone he works with-guards, elevator operators, mes-
sengers-with dignity and respect.
The Judge's straightforward and unpretentious character infuses
his judicial work. He takes pride in his opinions, but if forced to
choose between an eloquent, self-expressive opinion and a less satisfac-
tory one thai carries a majority with it, he will take the latter. He
knows that an imaginative separate opinion can help push the law
ahead, but he is not inclined to rely on this insight where by doing so he
might provoke a bad result. In this modest sense, he is indeed a "re-
sult-oriented" judge.
His prose style is direct and lucid when he drafts opinions himself.
When he edits a clerk's draft, he does so like the former English teacher
he is, with a pencil ready to strike purple passages, excess modifiers,
and passive constructions. The eloquent passages in his opinions are
simple and unadorned, like the then-bold conclusion of his 1956 New
Orleans school desegregation opinion: "[W]e are, all of us, freeborn
Americans, with a right to make our way, unfettered by sanctions im-
posed by man because of the work of God."" °
Unpretentious himself, the Judge has an eye for self-importance in
others. One of the .pleasures of working for him is to hear his commen-
tary on the passing scene, studded with terse and wry observations on
the ever-recurrent phenomenon of Potomac pomposity. I recall his
ironic recitations of a particularly vacuous and self-congratulatory
"Law Day" slogan. At other times he simply repeats in a tone of sin-
cere amazement some new piece of windbaggery.
The Judge's knack for spotting pretense deeply affects the sub-
stance of his judging. He learned about politics in Louisiana, a place in
which political mendacity and corruption seem to be local folk arts;
indeed, he made his mark there as the prosecutor of a major political
scandal. In Washington, he has become a close student of national
politics, which I believe he sees as something like the Louisiana version
played on a larger stage, with smoother actors and better script-writers.
A favorite quote of his is Jesse Unruh's "Money is the mother's milk of
politics."" He is not a cynic about government, believing as he firmly
does in the practical reform of the political process. But he is a realist,
and his knowledge of the actual workings of Congress and the federal
10. Bush. v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 138 F. Supp. 337, 342 (1956).
1I. TIME, Jan. 5, 1968, at 44 (statement of Jesse Unruh, former Speaker of the Califor-
nia Assembly). For both his realism and his belief in reform, see especially Wright, Politics
and the Constitution: Is Money Speech? 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
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agencies have left him unimpressed by the notion that the popular and
democratic nature of existing political institutions require judicial re-
straint.
The Judge's realism serves a sense of justice that reaches beyond
the requirements of formal equality. He likes Anatole France's obser-
vation that the law in its majestic equality prohibits rich and poor alike
from begging on the streets and sleeping under bridges. He sometimes
says, "Justice for the rich, mercy for the poor." It is a pungent way of
putting his fundamental belief that real justice requires taking account
of the realities of class and wealth.
In this aspect as elsewhere, the Judge's public philosophy and pri-
vate character are in harmony. He is not the sort of humanitarian who
has no use for particular human beings. I remember him as an excep-
tionally thoughtful boss, always alive to family problems or other spe-
cial circumstances in the lives of his clerks, and always ready to help
where he can. He has followed my life since I finished clerking with
unusually concrete, detailed and helpful concern, and I know that he
has done the same with other former clerks. He is not only respected
and admired but loved by those who have worked most closely with
him.
This, then, is a man different from the picture I had of Judge
Wright as a law student, attractively flamboyant in some ways as that
picture was. But the attractions of the real person are more lasting than
those of the robed rebel warrior of my dreams (and my teachers'
nightmares). He is a kind and decent man, with a sense of human com-
edy and human limitation; a judicial craftsman of high but practical
idealism; a prophet, not of some private vision, but of democracy and
human equality; a hero in the traditional American grain.
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